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Third party standing is a term of the law of civil procedure that describes when one party may file a lawsuit on behalf of another party. In the United States, this is generally prohibited, as a party can only assert his or her own rights and cannot raise the claims of a third party who is not before the court. However, there are several exceptions to this doctrine. For example, a third party may sue where he has interchangeable economic interests with the injured party, as in the case of a bookseller suing to enforce the rights of his patrons to purchase a particular book from his store. A third party may assert the rights of another person in order to vindicate them when the other person is unable to do so. For example, the US Supreme Court has held that a white person bound by a restrictive covenant not to sell realty to a black person may assert the Fifth or Fourteenth Amendment rights of black persons not before the court.〔(''Barrows v. Jackson'' ), 346 U.S. 249 (1953).〕 A party that represents a class in a certified class action suit may continue to represent the class even where their own stake in the suit has dissipated. A woman seeking to challenge the constitutionality of a law that prevents divorcees from remarrying within a year may continue to represent the class of similarly situated persons, even if the year passes and she is able to remarry before the case has been decided. ==General rule== Ordinarily, one may not claim standing in a court to vindicate the constitutional rights of some third party.〔See ''Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Comm. v. McGrath'', 341 U.S. 123, 149-154 (1951) (concurring opinion).〕 The requirement of standing is often used to describe the constitutional limitation on the jurisdiction of federal courts to "cases" and "controversies."〔See ''Coleman v. Miller'', 307 U.S. 433, 464 (1939)(concurring opinion).〕 Apart from the jurisdictional requirement, the US Supreme Court has developed a complementary rule. one of self-restraint for its own governance. which ordinarily precludes a person from challenging the constitutionality of state action by invoking the rights of others.〔See ''Ashwander v. TVA''36, 297 U. S. 288, 346-348 (1936) (concurring opinion).〕 The common thread underlying both requirements is that a person cannot challenge the constitutionality of a statute unless he shows that he himself is injured by its operation.〔''Barrows v. Jackson'', 346 U.S. 249 (1953).〕 Examples of application of this rule are: * ''Frothingham v. Mellon'', 262 U. S. 447, 486-489 (1923): federal taxpayer sought to challenge a federal statute in the enforcement of which federal revenues were applied, * ''Doremus v. Board of Ed.'', 342 U.S. 429, 434 (1952): state taxpayer unable to show that there was "a measurable appropriation or disbursement of . . . funds occasioned solely by the () activities complained of." * ''Tileston v. Ullman'', 318 U.S. 44 (1943): doctor sought a declaratory judgment that a state statute would deprive certain of his patients of their lives without due process of law), * ''Tyler v. Judges of Court of Registration'', 179 U.S. 405, 410 (1900): landowner sought to challenge the notice provisions for a land registration proceeding in which he had not made himself a party, although he had notice of the proceedings, and even though "his interest in the land would remain unaffected" if the act were subsequently declared unconstitutional. * ''Alabama Power Co. v. Ickes'', 302 U.S. 464, 478-480 (1938): "John Doe, let us suppose, is engaged in operating a grocery store. Richard Roe, desiring to open a rival and competing establishment, seeks a loan from a manufacturing concern which, under its charter, is without authority to make the loan. The loan, if made, will be ''ultra vires''." John Doe has no standing to sue to enjoin the loan. 抄文引用元・出典: フリー百科事典『 ウィキペディア（Wikipedia）』 ■ウィキペディアで「Third-party standing」の詳細全文を読む スポンサード リンク
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